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INTRODUCTION
Sub-saharan Africa, like so many third world and former
soviet bloc countries, have made economic growth as their
top priority goal and therefore, are seeking different and
sometimes creative ways to attract investment, trade,
technology and jobs to their own economies. This pursuit of
trade and investment is dictated by the universal need to
raise the standards of living for the peoples in these
countries. In many Sub-saharan economies, economic
development policies revolve around the basic needs of
feeding, housing and clothing the populations of their
respective countries. 1
The movement towards attracting foreign investment has
been paralleled by democratic political reforms and economic
liberalization of previously very autocratic and restrictive
2 See Marguerite Michaels, Retreat From Africa (U. S-Africa
relations) , 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS p. 93 (16) Winter, 1993. The
author states" The litany of statistics that marks the
continent's declining living standard is staggering. Africa's
economic growth rate is 1.5 percent - the world's lowest - and
it claims 32 of the bottom 40 countries on the U.N. annual
development index, a measure of comparative economic and
political progress. Food production is 20 percent lower than
it was in 1970, when the population was half the size. Only 37
percent Sub-Saharan Africans have clean drinking water; there
is one doctor for every 24,500 people; illiteracy rates are as
high as 80 percent in some countries. Population, meanwhile,
continues to grow at a rate of 3.2 percent annually versus 2.1
percent for Latin America and 1.8 percent for Asia . The
average life expectancy is 51 years, 12 fewer than for indians
and Chinese."
systems. To most outside observers, Africa is synonymous
with war, political instability, famine and disease.
According to the 1993 World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa
"is the only region in the world likely to experience an
increase in absolute poverty over the next decade."
In the past decade, many African countries instituted
major economic reforms, mostly at the insistence of the
world Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in order to
deal with the severe foreign debt situation and improve
their opportunities for attracting foreign investment . These
reforms also known as "structural adjustment", mainly
consisted of measures to trim budget deficits, devalue the
currencies, remove subsidies, free prices, liberalize trade
and sell off state-owned enterprises. The original
expectations were that these measures properly implemented,
would be able to spur growth and significantly reduce the
debt burden. Four years into this decade, many observers
have concluded that "structural adjustment" programs in
Africa have been, with a few exceptions, a disappointing
flop.
In the meantime, in order to accomplish the goals of
economic reform, many African countries enacted a host of
new investment laws designed to attract and protect foreign
investment." In General, these investment laws were crafted
to minimize or eliminate bureaucratic hurdles, establish
See World Bank, World Development Report, 1993, New
York: Oxford University Press.
see ICSID. Investment Laws of the World, Vol.1, For a
summary see, ECOSOC, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa and Strategies
to Encourage Transnational Corporations to Respond Positively to the
Improved Investment Climate: Report Of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. E/C. 10/1990/9, Mar. 13, 1990, at 13-18.
3guarantees against expropriation and provide incentives to
potential foreign investors. 4
SCOPE OF THESIS
This paper is to examine the relationship between
foreign investors and African host countries, in a
historical context. The issue presented here is whether there
is a historical explanation for economic problems many
African countries are currently facing. There will be then
a discussion of the current investment laws in selected Sub-
Saharan countries. There have been scattered literature
involving analysis of individual country investment laws.^
These have mainly focused on the technical provisions of the
investment regulations and the jurisprudential issues raised
by these laws. b The objective of this paper will be to
utilize a multi-disciplinary approach to examine the
fundamental policy issues that are involved in these laws.
This method will hopefully add more perspective to the
understanding of the successes and failure of these laws.
4 ICSID. id
e.g Chris Maina Peter, Promotion and Protection of
Foreign Investments in Tanzania, 6(1) ICSID REVIEW 42; Also
See, Shiferaw W. Michael, The New Ethiopian Joint Venture Law,
5(1) ICSID REVIEW 80; and Bertrand P. Marchais, The 1989
Investment Code Of Madagascar, 5(1) ICSID REVIEW 73
6See for example, Stephen C. Vasciannie, The Namibian
Foreign Investments Act: Balancing Interests in the New
Concessionary Era, 7(1) ICSID REVIEW 114, at page 116 says "
The Purpose of this article is to outline the main provisions
of the Namibian Act and to examine briefly the ways in such
provisions reconcile the interests of foreign capital and
the state, in the light of current perspectives on foreign
investment law and policy."
4This paper is going to examine the critical
relationship between the issues of control and protection
from the perspective of both the foreign investor and the
host nation. It will be contended that most problems and
obstacles faced by sub-saharan countries, looking for foreign
investment, will center around this dichotomous relationship
and that successful foreign investment policies will require
to strike a balance between these needs, in order to find an
optimal relationship.
In general attitudes towards foreign investment has
changed in most african countries, but so have the patterns
of foreign investment. There are now different sources of
capital, different recipients and different risk
considerations . These changes have been initiated and
precipitated by events, sometimes, beyond control of African
countries and therefore, not anticipated. It is therefore,
no longer enough to have a good attitude towards foreign
investment, but african countries are going to have to
employ innovative and competitive strategies, not only to
attract but also encourage investment in their local
communities . This Paper will discuss the impact of events
like the debt crisis, the establishment of a Single European
Market, the ending of the cold war, and the ending of
apartheid in South Africa, on the attitude towards and the
patterns of foreign investment.
When one reads literature emanating from foreign
capitals on the economic situation in Sub-saharan africa,
one easily gets a perception of a situation so grim and
5hopeless, that it is almost beyond arrest. This author is
going to argue that critics of the slow pace and lack of
progress in African development have been too quick to write
off the sub-continent and apportion blame. It will be
suggested that new and more realistic models of development
will be needed to address significant flaws that have led to
failure in previous development efforts; hence the search
for alternative solutions and ideas. This will essentially
involve an examination of how law reform is affecting
African development with particular reference to foreign
investment regulation and investment capital development in
general. Issues that need to be tackled are whether
assumptions and beliefs about the role of foreign investment
in african development need to be modified; 8 and what are
the other alternative choices available for capital
accumulation.
7
. One only needs to read such articles like The white
man's burden, (financial aid to Africa), 328 ECONOMIST p. 49 (2)
Sept. 25, 1993 and Marguerite Michaels, Retreat From Africa
(U.S.A-Africa relations) 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS p. 93 (16) Winter,
1993, to get such a depressing impression.
For the general discussion on the role of foreign
direct investment in economic growth and development see C.Fred
Bergsten ET. AL. . , American Multinationals and American Interests 354
(1978); see also Grant L. Reuber, Private Foreign Investment in
Development 1973
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A) THE COLONIAL ERA
During the colonial period capital formation was
derived from five principal sources; foreign (imperial)
governments, colonial governments borrowing from abroad,
foreign private investors (both portfolio and direct)
,
colonial government taxation and private savings. ^
The principal purposes of capital investment, especially in
the early stages of development, was to develop and
establish trade, communication, administrative and military
infrastructure. 10 Subsequently territories endowed with
extensive mineral and other natural resources tended to
attract a higher level of investment capital investment than
those territories that were lacking in vital resources. This
is one of the reasons that the proponents of the theory
dependency have maintained the view that colonial economies
were developed as peripheral extensions of the metropolitan
and internationalist capitalist economy. According to this
theory, a state of dependency based on a master-servant
relationship, between the less developed former colonies and
the developed metropolitan countries, which existed in the
JD.K FIELDHOUSE, BLACK AFRICA 1945-1980, p . 37 ( 1986)
105ee, Alan Pirn, Capital Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa
in AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF TROPICAL AFRICA (VOL. 2)227, 228-
230 (Z.A and J.M Konczacki eds . , 1977)
7colonial era will continue to subsist until the former are
able to stand on their own in all aspects. 1;
i) The Colonial Companies
The primary pioneers in foreign flow of capital to
colonial Africa were the colonial charter companies which
were formed by the metropolitan imperial states for the
specific purpose of exploiting their colonial overseas
possessions
.
Among the most notable were the British East Africa
company, The United Africa Company, Deutsche-Ostafrikanische
Gesellschaft (The Germany East Africa Company) , Lever
Brothers of Liverpool (later became Unilever) and so on...
Referring to the British East India Company, the following
quotation reflects the nature and scope of a colonial
charter company:
The merchants of [the British East India Company]
received the entire rights over all India they
could bring under their sway. ... As its director,
Sir Josiah Child, once boasted, the India Company
was "a sovereign state in itself. "It declared war
on the Mogul Empire, it had a fleet, an army, and
fortified settlements, it could coin money and
make laws. Businessmen administered India in their
"
: The "dependency theory" has been defined as "A set of
interrelated propositions that identify the process of unequal
exchange in economic and social relations between the third
world and the industrialized countries, in which the economic
performance and social structures of dependent countries are
dominated by those of the richer countries." See J.P DICKESON
& Et Al., A GEOGRAPHY OF THE THIRD WORLD p. 173 (1983), Methuen.
own fashion, and a very lively it was for a long
time. 12
The colonial company was bestowed with political powers and
sometimes reinforced with military force. It had power over
the indigenous society. These companies had the initial
responsibility of administering and developing the colonial
economies for the purpose of supplying raw materials to the
mother country's industries. Because colonies were
considered an appendix to the metropolitan country's
economy, economic development was very much restricted to
products considered vital for the mother country or for re-
export; duplication or development of competing products was
rigorously discouraged. 13
ii) Legal Controls
The advent of colonialism brought with it the influence
of imperial European laws to the colonies. Imperial
companies operating in the colonies enjoyed the full
protection of their mother country laws. These laws also
operated to protect these companies against competition from
other European countries. Trade and investment in the
colonies was regulated by strict laws directed at
centralizing exports and imports of each colony upon the
imperial country,
iii) Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers
Tariffs were maximized in order to prevent trade being
diverted to other areas. 1 ' The primary aim of the imperial
12 P.T ELLSWORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1964), P. 33
lsENDEL-JACOB KOLDE, ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
(1982) Wadsworth, p. 173-4
14 Id. .at p. 173
9European states was to regulate commerce in such a way as to
maximize their share of trade in both directions and also
the profits from it. The English navigation acts, dating back
from the 1650' s were applied to regulate colonial trade and
commerce.
11
' According to these acts, all goods imported to
the colonies had to be either the product of Britain or had
to be transshipped and pay duties there. All colonial trade
had to be carried in British-owned and registered vessels.
Furthermore, colonies were prohibited or restricted from
manufacturing to trade in a certain range of products. These
controls together with a system of preferential tariffs,
helped British shipowners, merchants and manufacturers
maintain a virtual monopoly over colonial trade and enabled
the government to maximize its revenues from the taxes of
the colonial trade. 16
iv) Local Traders:
Although colonial legal system protected colonial
companies doing business in the colonies, the colonial
authorities did not provide the same protection to the local
merchants .The few local traders that managed to advance into
produce marketing as buyers and middlemen were easily
displaceable with well financed foreign competitors. The
governments viewed the role of the local people as producers
of cash crops like cocoa, coffee, rubber for export purposes
15D.K FIELDHOUSE, COLONIALISM 1870-1945, p. 54 (New York:
St. Martin's Press-1981)
lb Id. Also see, ROBERTS, HISTORY OF FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY
for the discussion of French colonial tariff policy. The
French colonial tariff system was different from the British
in that it discriminated between territories known as
"assimilated colonies" and non-assimilated colonies. Their
policies, however, had a similar objective of restricting and
in some ways close the colonies from the rest of the world.
10
and did not encourage them to engage in commercial and
industrial activities. The colonial merchants and foreign
investors, on the other hand, enjoyed government support,
especially, in obtaining exclusive access to financial and
credit facilities usually also owned by colonial companies.
B) AFTER INDEPENDENCE:
After world war 11, there was a rush of decolonization
in Asia, followed by a succession of Black African countries
gaining independence in the early I960' s. There was no single
reason for the rapid decolonization but a combination of
factors. Chief among these were, the increasing nationalist
demands for independence from the colonized people and
pressure from external forces. These external influences
were mainly exerted by anti-imperialist movements from
communist countries and pressure from the USA which had long
been shut out of colonial market. 17
Because of and due to the varied colonial experiences
of the new independent states, the post colonial African
governments opted for different routes towards economic
development. Newly independent states attitudes toward
foreign investment largely depended on the degree of
emphasis on the market-driven economy as the vehicle for the
economic development strategy.
The English speaking sub-saharan countries opted for
four (4) different types of development strategies: 18
i) States oriented towards public ownership-Ghana, Tanzania
and Zambia;
r
'J.P DICKENSON Et Al
,
supra at 36-37
lriYUSUFU BANGURA, BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH AFRICA,
(Manchester University Press-1983)
,
p. 188
11
ii) States pursuing a policy of indigenisation of
Africanization- Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda;
iii) States within the residual pound sterling bloc- Sierra
Leone, Gambia and Malawi;
iv) States dependent on the Republic of South Africa-
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. 1 '
i) Public Ownership:
These states followed policies that favored increasing
state involvement in the direction and management of the
economy. Although these countries did not 'adopt Marxist and
/or socialist models of government', they, nevertheless,
believed that strong government involvement and leadership
in the economy was imperative in order to deal with the
acute problems facing their societies. 20
They embarked on the program of nationalization and
restricted the expansion of foreign private investment .Most
of the property expropriated belonged to the local
subsidiaries of the MNC,s. 21 The governments became heavily
involved in the micro-management of the economy. For
example, in Zambia after the "Mulungushi Declarations" of the
late 1960s, the government asked companies to 'invite' it to
lL,Id..at p. 189-198; The author warns 'not to put too much
weight' on this typology as these groups are not mutually
exclusive
.
20Peter Kenneth Kiplagat, Legal Aspects of Political &
Economic Reform in E. Europe & Africa, 4 African journal of
international and comparative law, 927, 928(1992). This political
Ideology was referred to as 'AFRICAN SOCIALISM' . These
governments were characterized by one party state structures
and tended to focus heavily on public (State) rights as
against individual and human rights.
2!Oserheimen A, Osunbor, Nigeria ' s Investment laws and the
State's Control of Multinationals, 3(1) icsid review 38, 39
12
participate in 51% share-ownership arrangements in a variety
of economic areas."
Post independence legislation passed reflected the
nationalists needs to gain control over their economic and
social destiny. Exchange control legislation was enacted to
restrict the transfer of funds out of the country. For
example, in Nigeria, the Exchange Control act of 1962 placed
all foreign exchange transactions under the supervision of
the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank." The
immigration act introduced controls and restrictions to the
employment of aliens in local businesses, including a
requirement for work permit before an alien could take up
employment or engage in business activities. 24 In Zambia,
Foreign investors were excluded from all retail trade; which
was restricted to Zambians, state companies and co-
operatives .Tanzania nationalized all banks, food processing
companies and insurance companies under the policy of 'self-
reliance and socialism 1 established by the 1967 Arusha
Declaration. 25
These policies led to a general decline in foreign
investment . In Tanzania, between 1968 and 1971, British
private investment declined from 10.9 million Pound
Sterling. 2 " In most of these countries, other aspects of
economic and social development were also negatively
"See generally, BEVERAGE AND OBERRSCHALL, AMERICAN
BUSINESSMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA (1976) ;CHILESHE, THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS : ZAMBIA (1986)
2i See, Osunbor, supra note 13, at p. 46
24 Id.
2
-See Bangura, supra note 10, at p. 192-194
26 Id
13
impacted. Economic performance measured in terms of per
capita GDP, replacement investment, real exports, national
debt, inflation and unemployment was discouragingly poor.
Social policies regarding population growth, education and
health services were likewise disappointing. 7
ii) Indigenization or Africanization:
The purpose of this policy was to exclude foreign
participation in some selected economic sectors and their
restriction to various sets of limits in others. 2 "' This
policy was different from nationalization, in that the
government was still committed to private enterprise and
wanted the private sector, including the private foreign
investor, to provide impetus for development. Here too, the
state was instrumental in controlling and regulating foreign
investment, but mainly for the benefit of the local
entrepreneurs
.
The policy of indigenization consisted of four (4)
principal components:
a) indigenization of ownership or capital;
b) indigenization of the board of directors or control;
c) indigenization of manpower or personnel;
d) indigenization of technology- the selection and
absorption of technology.^
2
'Thomas Allen, The law relating to Foreign investment in
Manufacturing in Bostwana, Zambia and Zimbabwe 4 AFRICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, (RADIC) (1992)44,
46
28 See, Osunbor, supra note 13, at p. 40. Note that the
author the term 'Africanization' in a generic sense and points
out that each country applied the policy in preference to its
own citizens.
29 Id.
14
Legislation was passed to reflect the policies of these
governments. As in cases of nationalizations, exchange
control measures were introduced to reduce the outflow of
capital. New immigration laws were introduced to restrict
employment of foreigners to areas with critical shortage of
qualified citizens.
The companies Acts were revised to move away from the
British Model Companies Act of 1908. In Nigeria, the new
Companies act of 1968 required the registration of foreign
companies, significantly increased disclosure requirements
by requiring publication of consolidated accounts
statements, profit and loss statements and the disclosure of
nationality of directors and members of boards. i( Likewise,
custom duties and tariffs were raised to protect domestic
industries
.
Indigenization per se, did not negatively impact flow
of foreign investment like nationalization did. There was
some outflow of capital in some countries prompted by lack
of appropriate provision for "prompt, fair and adequate"
compensation and by fears about the political uncertainty.'"
iii) Residual Pound Sterling Bloc:
30 Id at p. 41; Section 369, Part x of the 1968 Nigerian
Companies Act provided that every "foreign company" which had
an established place of business in Nigeria on October 1, 1968
would be "deemed to have been incorporated in Nigeria" .This
provision made foreign companies subject to Nigerian law
since, technically, in some matters such as existence and
capacity, companies are governed by the laws of their
incorporation.
^See Bangura, Supra note 10 at p. 197. Kenya and Nigeria
experienced substantially less negative impact on their
foreign investment status. In fact both countries had a marked
increase in the flow investment. Uganda, on the other hand,
suffered massive exodus of foreign capital; mainly due to its
erratic and unpredictable political environment.
15
The countries in this group were those that continued,
even after independence, to peg their currencies to the
British pound sterling. Their close links with the sterling
provided a free payments system with Britain, a situation
which was advantageous to foreign investors in general, and
British investors in particular. 1 ' Like the indigenisation
states, the 'residual sterling bloc' believed in private
enterprise and indigenisation. But because of their limited
natural and capital resources, and fragile economic base;
they placed foreign investment ahead of indigenisation in
terms of their development priorities.
These countries also maintained a low key approach to
international politics and tended to avoid contentious
stances on foreign affair issues or political ideologies.
They also opted for an open door policy towards foreign
investment. Malawi had detailed programs for attracting
foreign investors, such as industrial licensing, incentives,
tax rebates and financial drawbacks. 34
These policies had a positive effect on the flow of
foreign investment towards these countries. In general,
there was a steady cooperation between the state, citizens
and foreign investors in banking, insurance, commerce and
transport. However, these countries suffered from limited
natural resources and fragile economic bases. This tended to
32 Id at p. 198
S3Id at p. 199. President Kamuzu Banda rejected the
socialist policies adopted by the neigbhouring countries as
"disastrous for foreign investment" and he also maintained
close relations with then white ruled Rhodesia and South
Africa- Malawi's principal sources of foreign investment and
trading partners.
'"Industrial Development in Malawi: A GUIDE FOR
PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS, 1970 p. 3 and pp. 20-23
16
minimize their opportunities for attracting foreign
investment
.
iv) Dependants of the Republic Of South Africa
These are the countries which share common borders with
and whose economies were characterized by the dominant
presence of the Republic of South Africa.'' Most of the
Foreign investment came from South Africa and shared the
'Rand' as their common currency. 1 '
In summary, when many sub-saharan countries gained
independence and nationhood, they soon discovered that this
was mostly in name and lacked real substance. They found
that they had very limited human and physical
infrastructure. They had inherited colonial institutions,
many of which had at best, a mystical relevance to their
values and aspirations. Unfortunately, for the post
independence governments of Africa, they, like their
colonial predecessors which had no electorate to account
for, governed by expediency, backed by military force to
enforce their policies. The public distrust of the
government created during the colonial era continued even
after independence.
^'Bangura, Supra note 13, pp. 200-202. During the colonial
period the British government had assumed that the three
countries would be absorbed into the Union of South Africa and
had therefore, not interfered with the natural processes of
South African economic penetration.
36 Id. Botswana withdrew from the common currency in 1974
CHAPTER II
A) THE DEBT CRISIS
The African debt crisis began as part of the
international debt crisis that threatened the economies of
both the world's richest and poorest with financial
collapse. Several explanations have been offered for the
crisis but no single reason has been blamed as the major
cause. The important point is that the debt crisis marked an
extraordinary event in African development,
i) Causes of the debt crisis:
The causes for debt crisis can be grouped into two
categories; External and internal causes.
The external reasons were a combination of international
events which directly or indirectly impacted economic and
social processes on African continent.
The debt problems began with enormous rise in the oil
prices of the early 1970' s. - 7 The oil exporting countries
placed a lot of their proceeds on deposit in international
banks; which in turn needed borrowers to recycle the money
profitably. Meanwhile, the rise of the oil prices had a
negative impact on economic activity in developed countries
and this drove down interest rates. 38
"Debtor ' s Prison (A survey of Third World Finance) , 32!
ECONOMIST, p.T7(4), sept. 25, 1993
38 Id.
17
18
The international banks competing for the growing
market offered loans to developing countries on increasingly
more generous terms. They offered longer loan maturities,
longer grace periods and narrower spreads over their own
cost of funds.' Under these circumstances, the external
debts of developing countries jumped from under $100 billion
in 1972 to more than $ 600 billion in 1981. 40
Meanwhile, as industrial economies were slowing down,
commodity exports from developing countries were fetching
higher prices on the world market. The developing country
borrowers were able to increase their output so as to exceed
the real interest rate on their debt. This meant that
developing countries could maintain attractive debt-to-
exports ratios and increase their external borrowing without
increasing the burden of debt in relation to the size of
their economies. 41
These external events were compounded with region
specific factors which further complicated the Sub-saharan
debt situation. The first major cause for the debt burden was
the slow pace of development widely attributed to inherited
economic problems at the time of independence. 4 ' All Sub-
Saharan African countries gained independence at a very
stage of their development with very limited human, economic
39Id.
40-
'Id.- Most of the debt consisted of syndicated commercial
loans
.
41 Id
4
"Carol Lancaster, African Economic Reform: The External Dimension
Policy Analysis in International Economics-33) June 1991, p. 4
19
and communication infrastructure/ 1 The newly independent
countries were facing formidable development challenges but
had limited resources. Understandably, therefore, these
countries were anxious to promote their development
programs
.
A Second major cause for the debt burden was the
accumulated problems of economic mismanagement by the
African governments. This was the result of ' a combination
of the weak capacity of many governments (including a lack
of economic expertise, poor organization and training of
government officials, too many and conflicting agencies or
institutions and poor leadership) , the overriding political
goals of leaders, and tendency of many African politicians
and bureaucrats to regulate as much of their economies as
was feasible'. 44 Some writers have called this the
'miscalculation of the early post-independence leaders in
asserting a philosophy and praxis of development that did
not place Africa's interest above any other geo-political
consideration' . 4b
The third cause of debt accumulation had to do with the
exports oriented nature of most African economies. This
makes these economies highly sensitive to conditions in the
5
'Id. Zaire had fewer than 20 college graduates at the
time of independence. Communication systems linking African
capitals had to be relayed through capitals. Most all weather
roads in the interior of Africa typically run from the
hinterland to the coast in service of export oriented
economies
.
44 ld.
4 Thomas Odhiambo, Hope Born Out of Despair, (Nairobi, English Press
Ltd, 1988), p.xiii
20
product markets.' 1 " So when the terms of trade significantly
improved in the early 1970' s, many African governments
suddenly found themselves with windfall of foreign exchange
earnings. Instead of investing or saving these earnings,
they spent them on poorly planned and unproductive projects.
ii) A Profile of the Crisis:
The above discussion gives a background picture of the
circumstances that snared some African countries into the
deep hole of the debt trap. Many governments had borrowed
against future export earnings.
Beginning in the late 1970 's, commodity prices collapsed,
leading to a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade. The
governments were now juxtaposed in a situation whereby
'their imports, government employment, and expenditures had
expanded while their export and budgetary revenues had
dropped'. 47 This led to further commercial borrowing and
additional aid to offset loss of revenue in export
earnings. The loss of export revenues was particularly severe
on the oil importing economies. When the debts came due for
repayment many of these governments found that they did not
have sufficient revenues to service these loans.
Over the past decade, African countries registered some
of the slowest growth rates in the world. Per capita income
which remained fairly stagnant between 1973 and 1980, slid
nearly 3 percent per year between 1981 and 1987. Only four
countries had per capita income growth in 1981-84. 4B Even
with the modest growth in some, the majority of the African
^See, Carol Lancaster, Supra note 34
4 Id at p.
3
^"World Bank Report, 1990 p. 55
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countries have consistently experienced below average
economic growth throughout the 1980, s as compared with other
low income areas of the world. There is no doubt therefore,
that the debt problem is just part of Africa's broader
problems of poor economic mismanagement, poor use of
economic aid and deterioration in terms of trade.''
iii) The Economic and Social impact on Low Income Sub-
Saharan Economies:
The debt burden has impacted African economic
performance in three principal ways. First, the heavy debt
tended to discourage voluntary capital inflows, both private
inflows and repatriation of capital from abroad. Both
foreign and local investors were unwilling to invest in
heavily indebted economies for fear of future restrictions
on their ability to gain access to their profits or to
finance needed imports.
Second, because high foreign debt resulted in high
inflation and artificially repressed interest rates, many
debtor countries suffered from capital flight. This is the
situation whereby nationals with capital, move it to
financial institutions abroad in order to protect their
assets from future economic uncertainties. A recent study
has suggested that net capital outflows from Sub-Saharan
Africa as a whole, although estimated at only $40 billion
between 1976 and 1987, "are comparable to flows from a
country such as Argentina, Brazil, or Venezuela". 50
'"Carol Lancaster, Supra note 34 at p. 29
50Chang, P.H Kevin and Robert E.Cumby 1990, "Capital
Flight in Sub-Saharan Countries" . A paper to a World Bank
Symposium on African External Finance, Washington (September)
,
p. 19. Capital flight from Nigeria alone is estimated to have
totaled $17.5 billion, with $11 billion outflows between 1985
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Finally, heavy debt discouraged commercial lending
which negatively impacted the flow of new private
investment. Most low income African countries had limited
access to medium and long term foreign bank lending; but
even this limited access dried up as soon as these countries
became unable to service their debts,
iv) Structural Adjustment and Political Reform:
The immediate predicament facing the heavily indebted
countries was starvation of external finance for new
investment, rising taxation, high inflation and diminished
incentive for economic reform and long years of economic
stagnation and social deterioration. Under these desperate
circumstances, the African countries turned to their only
hope left for rescue; the World Bank and the IMF. In order
to be of help to the African countries, these two
institutions formulated two broad policies to which the
needy countries were required to conform. These were
structural adjustment and conditionally. 51
Under structural adjustment, The World Bank and foreign
aid donors asked African governments to implement programs
intended to improve the efficiency of national economic
resources, encourage additional production and economic
growth and to create a positive environment for private
investment. Conditionality or economic restructuring, on the
other hand, are usually short term stabilization programs
supported by the IMF. They involve both macro and micro
and 1987.
L
-For a comprehensive study see the following: Justin B.
Zulu and Saleh M. Nsouli, Adjustment Programs in Africa: The
Recent Experience, (Washington D.C.," THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, 1985);Heller G.K., The IMF and Africa in the
1980s, 17(1) CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES (1983), P. 23
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economic policies designed to reduce the gap in the
country's balance of payments." The thrust of the policy
was 'to shrink the budget deficit, devalue the currency,
remove subsidies, free prices, liberalize trade, sell off
state owned enterprises and devise new investment codes that
promote private investment. The goal of the Bretton Woods
Institutions-The IMF and The World Bank- was to reduce the
role of African governments in economic management and
foster free market conditions. Over 30 African countries are
currently engaged in or have recently implemented programs
of stabilization, structural adjustment or both."
The general belief behind these programs shared by the
Bretton Woods institutions, the donor governments and
African economists is that Africans, like individuals
elsewhere, 'will respond to economic incentives in
predictable ways'. 54 That structural differences, like
cultural values, limited physical infrastructure, vested
political interests are temporary obstacles which will
eventually give way to such response. Implicit in this
belief is the assumption, based on past experience, that
African governments are characteristically incapable of
implementing effective state-led growth strategies. 5 '
52Carol Lancaster, Supra note 34, p. 12
53 Id.
"Id at p. 13
"Id. But see, Report of Economic Commission for Africa
1989, African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment
Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation. New
York: United Nations. In this report, the commission
challenged the Bretton Woods institutions supported economic
reforms in Africa and argued for a greater role for the state
in African economic reform. The also acknowledged, however,
that in the past African governments have proved to be poor
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Table 1 below shows that according to World Bank
analyses, overall economic growth, growth in the volume of
exports, and growth in gross domestic saving have all been
consistently higher in those countries undertaking strong
reform programs than in those whose reforms were less
comprehensive or intense/"
TABLE 1 GDP growth rates in four African countries
,
1981-89 (percentages) a
Country 1981-84 1985-87 1988-89
Ghana -2.3 4.7 5.9
Madagascar 1.6 1.8 3.9
Malawi 1.8 1.8 3.5
Togo -3.0 3.0 4.7
Annual sales
Source: World Bank (1990b, 13).
v) Current International Debt Management Arrangements:
At the onset of the debt crisis international debt
management consisted of three types of arrangements
involving private and public creditors, international
financial institutions (IFIs) and individual creditor
countries. Typically, when a country finds itself unable to
fully meet its debt servicing obligations, it will seek
rescheduling of its public bilateral debt through the so-
economic managers.
'""Strong" reformers according to the World Bank's (1990,
13) criteria for that time period include Burundi, Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, and Togo. "Average"
performers include the Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.
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called Paris Club (a group creditor governments) and of its
private debt through the London Club (a group of private
creditor financial institutions, usually chaired by the bank
with the largest exposure in the debtor country)
.
Before a creditor government or financial institution
agrees to a rescheduling, a creditor government or bank will
usually require the debtor government to obtain a
stabilization agreement approved by the IMF executive board.
An IMF supported stabilization program will typically be
accompanied by a loan from the fund made on near commercial
terms, intended to ease the downward pressure on import
levels resulting from the stabilization measures.
In addition to the above debt management and
stabilization measures, other international financing
arrangements have been employed to mobilize development
financing for Africa. These include Consultative Groups
(CGs) , Roundtables and The Special Program Of Assistance
(SPA) of low-income debt-distressed African countries. 5
In sum, there has been a two pronged approach to try
and resolve Africa's debt crisis and to finance economic
reform. One approach focused on stabilization and debt
management and is led by the IMF; the other focused on
economic growth and is led by the World Bank.
B) PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND LESSONS OF THE DEBT CRISIS:
The results from Africa's debt crisis management and
economic reform have not been to date so clear cut and
conclusive. Although there has been remarkable successes in
,7 For a detailed discussion of these programs see, World
Bank. 1990b. World Development Report . Washington: World Bank;
World Bank. 1990c. Special Program of Assistance '.Growth, Aid
Debt : Proposal for the Second Phase. Washington: World Bank
Africa Region (July)
.
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some selected African countries, it is safe to say that, in
general, structural adjustment has not met the expectations
of all the parties involved. Countries like Ghana, Burundi,
Mauritius and the Seychelles which adopted IMF and/or world
Bank-backed reforms have shown signs of exceptional
transformation. These countries have begun to experience
accelerated GDP growth rates, lowered inflation, declining
fiscal deficits and expanding exports.''
On the other hand, countries like Kenya, Zambia,
Zimbabwe; to name but a few which have dragged their feet
and sometimes resisted making necessary and overdue reforms
have not fared so well. For these economies growth has been
very slow indeed in per capita terms; some have seen per
capita output fall. Their export prices have fallen sharply
and their debts remain beyond their capacity to pay.
Against this background, chances of attracting more new
foreign capital are becoming increasingly dimmer. 5 -
There are several lessons that have been attributed to
the experiences of the debt crisis. First, African countries
now realize that with the end of the cold war, rich-world
priorities have changed and the former no longer take its
sources of foreign assistance for granted. African countries
are now competing with all other countries, sometimes better
endowed, for increasingly limited capital resources. The
flip side of this, is that the rich countries; no longer
shackled by cold war needs, are redefining the purposes of
""Feldman, Gerald M.
,
Sub-Saharan Africa is poised for
renewed private sector growth: Commitment to free enterprise
was reaffirmed in 1992 ' BUSINESS AMERICA, April 19, 1993, at
p. 33(2)
''Debtors ' Prison. (A survey of Third Worid Finance)
ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1993, atp.T7(4).
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their financial assistance and redirecting their
investments. 60
Second, African countries are now learning that
countries that are attracting most of the foreign capital
from the private market have two main things going for them.
One is that their debt-service obligations look manageable,
either because they have usually avoided high debt
obligations or because they have completed comprehensive
debt-reducing arrangement with their financiers. The other
is that their economic policies tend to be conducive to
macroeconomic stability and private initiative." 1 This has
meant cutting government spending to live within means, and
avoiding or reducing over-reliance on debt financing to
increase price stability.
Third, the debt crisis has genuinely and definitely
affected African attitudes towards private investment in
particular, and business in general. Many of these countries
are recognizing the close relationship between their socio-
political aspirations and the imperative economic
priorities . Thus governments which have taken a leading role
in implementing structural reform to eliminate waste,
mismanagement, corruption and encouraging of private
enterprise have seen far better results.
' The White Man's Burden. (Financial Aid To Africa)
328 ECONOMIST p. 49 (2), Sept 25, 1993. The Magazine reports
that (quoting UNICEF sources) that" Only a tiny share of aid-
less than 10% goes directly to things that help the poor:
primary health care, basic literacy and education (especially
for women), clean water, family planning."
blMore Money (A Survey Of Third World Finance) 32 8
ECONOMIST p.T15(4), Sept 25, 1993. The report says that
countries which meet the first criterion also meet the
second; i.e countries that have good economic policies tend to
avoid serious debt problems.
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Effective and successful policies now recognize that
the private sector has to play a greater role in allocating
scarce resources and in achieving optimal production of
goods and services. Africans also realize that genuine
reform will occur only if the initiative is generated from
within and not 'imposed' from without. The Nigerian
statesman once said:
I believe that for us in Africa, our salvation
lies in our own hands and nowhere else. Only we
can be the architects of our future; as we have
been the architects of misfortune by and large for
the past quarter of a century. 62
b2Quoted in Aronson David, why africa stays poor: and Why
it Doesn't have to 53 HUMANIST P. 9 (6) March-April, 1993. Also
the Africa's new attitude towards economic reform could be
noticed at the recent 1994 Organization of African Unity
Conference in Tunis: See, Business First Says OAU (Cover
Story) AFRICAN BUSINESS July/August, 1994
CHAPTER III
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT REGULATION:
In the developing economies, the function of investment
is to push those factors which may lead to economic
progress. During the 1960s, the newly independent African
countries formulated economic policies and drafted
development plans in attempts of realizing their economic
and social aspirations. New investment laws were promulgated
and old laws were modified in order to create a framework
and to facilitate the realization of those aspirations. But
the interests of the developing society are, more often than
not, not congruent to those of the investors and suppliers
of capital. It is, therefore, not surprising that this area
of law that has seen a lot of changes in the past two
decades
.
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According to the 1965 United Nations Economic
Commission For Africa study, the function of a comprehensive
investment legislation is to declare and define the policy
of the government with respect to areas of needed
b
""... any major change in economic and social
arrangements which a government wishes to introduce must be
procured by revision of law; change of law is thus an
instrument or consequence of economic changes". See "Legal
Development and Economic Growth in Africa" by Dr. A.N. Alott
in Changing Law in Developing Countries. Studies in Modern
Asia and Africa 2. (Ed.) J.N.D. Anderson. London, 1963.
pp. 195-6
29
•^H
;:
'
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investment. 64 The study also stated that investment codes
typically represent a good faith attempt to present in, one
piece of legislation, the basic provisions on investment in
the country concerned. The primary purpose of such laws is
to promote and facilitate investment by easing prospective
investors' task in identifying the relevant local law. 61
Since capital, both domestic and foreign, is scarce; the
codes will usually provide for ways to administer and
channel it in order to effectively contribute to
establishment of infrastructure. bb
According to the study cited above, a typical
investment code will contain certain legal attributes." It
will enumerate and classify categories of 'approved'
industries. 68 The code will describe the authority
64 United Nations. Economic Commission For Africa:
Standing Committee on Industry and Natural Resources.
Investment Laws and Regulations In Africa at 2, U.N.
Doc.E/CN.14/INR/28/REV.2, Sales No. 65. U.K. 3 (1965)
Id,
66For example, See Thomas Allen The Law Relating to
Private Foreign Investment in Manufacturing in Botswan, Zambia
and Zimbabwe 4 RADIC 44 (1992) . The Author cites section 3 and
4 of the Botswana Industrial Development Act 1988 as
establishing The Industrial Licensing Authority for the
purpose of administering and controlling foreign investment .He
also cites section 17(c) of the Zambia's Investment Act of
1986 which gives the Investment coordinating committee the
authority to approve license "if it finds that:
. .
.
(b) the activity planned to be undertaken by the business
enterprise is not unlawful or contrary to the interests of
Zambia .
"
67 United Nations Supra note 64, at page 4.
b85ee Chris Maina Peter, Promotion and Protection of
Foreign Investment in Tanzania: A New Investment Code 6(1)
ICSID REVIEW 42, 53; This article discusses these provisions
found in Part A of the schedule of Tanzania Investment
(Promotion and Protection) Act, 1990. See also Ndiva Kofele-
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responsible for examining supervising of investments/' It
will contain regulations pertaining to entry or admission of
foreign capital into the territories of a country. It will
also contain regulations concerning a variety of guarantees
and tax and other incentives designed to woe potential
investors. Other features of these laws may include
provisions relating to the employment of nationals and
foreign nationals, rules to the standards and conditions of
expropriation or nationalization and the settlement of
disputes between foreign investors and the host states. :
In recent years African countries, like other
developing counties, have used investment laws as
instruments for promotion of industrial development. Since
independence, governments of African countries have pursued
a variety of policies and schemes to induce private
enterprise, both domestic and foreign, to get involved in
the economy. However, the role of private investment vis a
vis the role of government, in economic development has been
Kale, Investment Codes as Instruments of Economic Policy: A
Cameroon Case Study 25(4) THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
821,829(1991), which discusses the same provisions in
reference to the Cameroon Investment Code of 1990
6y5ee Thomas Allen note 66 at 50, for example, discusses
sect. 5 of Bostwana Industrial Development Act, 1988
establishing the Industrial Licensing Authority.
10United Nations Supra note 64 at pp. 4-17; See also
generally Legal aspects of Doing Business in Africa in Vol.4
International Business Series ( Dennis Campbell ed. 1991) and
T.M Ocran The Legal Framework of Foreign Investment in Africa
12 ZAMBIA L.J.I (1980)
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the subject of wide debate and many issues remain
unresolved. 71
Likewise, there is little information on what effect, if
any, investment laws and regulations have on the inflow of
private investment.'' There are, however, several studies
71 Some writers have argued that " the aggregate effects
of foreign direct investment (FDI ) are usually positive on
national income, jobs, and government revenues in host
countries ... [though] major doubts remain about the impact of
foreign direct investment on both the capital and current
accounts of host-country balance-of-payments position" See,
C.Fred Bergsten Et. Al
.
, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AMERICAN
INTERESTS 1978, pp. 368-9. Also See, Grant L.Rueber PRIVATE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT (1973). But critics argue
that:
multinationals take out of developing countries
more than they put in; and thus, if annual
repatriation of earnings exceed annual infusions of
new foreign capital, multinationals undermine
balance-of-payment positions. They increase
unemployment by using capital intensive techniques
developed for their own labor-scarce, high-wage
economies, rather than labor-intensive techniques
thought to be more appropriate for developing
countries. They promote unequal income
distribution, local high-income groups strengthen
their positions through alliances with foreign
investors. Economic growth itself may be stunted,
both short and long term, because the foreign firms
drain away local capital brain power that could
otherwise create strong indigenous industries. In
addition, they generate, though advertising,
consumption patterns inappropriate for countries
early stages of development; and they limit the
countries' technological progress by doing the bulk
of their research and development elsewhere.
See, BERGSTEN ET AL . , SUPRA, AT 355
''Some studies have shown link between fiscal incentives
and direct foreign investments in developing countries; See,
S.M.S. Shah & J.F.J. Toye, Fiscal Incentives For Firms In Developing
Countries: Survey and Critique, in TAXATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
269(J.F.J Toye ed., 1978). See also, Stephen E. Guisinger Et
al ., investments incentives and performance requirements:
patterns of international trade, production, and
Investment (1985)
.
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and publications which have focused on the legal aspects of
doing business in developing countries and on the legal
dominions governing foreign direct investment. These
studies have provided useful information on the legal
environment and regulatory framework of doing business in
Africa and other developing countries.
One major problem with most of these studies is their
lack of recognition of relationship between regulatory
control of investment, attitudes towards investment and the
flow of foreign direct investment .One comprehensive study
analyzed the link between investment laws and other social
and economic factors. 74 According to this study, there is a
positive relationship flow of FDI and generosity of
incentives package offered by the host country, taking into
account the natural resources, economic development and rate
of economic growth. It is, therefore possible, according to
this study, to gauge the direction of FDI flow given the
factors under study. 75
"See, Legal Aspects of Doing Business In Africa
In International Business Series Vol 4. (Dennis Campbell ed. ,
1986) /Also See Duane E.Sams The legal Aspects of Doing in
Cameroon, 17 INT'L LAW 489(1983)
,4Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Political Economy Of Foreign
Direct Investment: A Framework For Analyzing investment laws
and Regulations in Developing Countries 23 LAW & POLICY IN
INTERN 'l BUSINESS 619, (1992) . This study involved an empirical
analysis, using regression method, to investigate the
relationship between Foreign direct investment (FDI) and other
factors like the generosity of incentive package (GIC) offered
by the host country, the natural resources (NR) , economic
development (ED)
,
and the rate of economic growth (GR) . The
study investigated investment laws of three countries:
Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Kenya which the author picked as
offering the most conducive climate for direct investment in
Africa
.
i !j Id at p. 670
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As the author of this study admits, the above analysis
provides but only a partial explanation of the dynamics of
investment flow. Other factors, which are extraneous but
closely connected to the legal regime, also play a
significant role. One of these factors, it is submitted, is
the attitude of the host government's towards foreign
investment, in particular and business in general.
A) ATTITUDE TOWARDS INVESTMENT:
The present analysis will attempt to offer a
comparative analysis of selected aspects of some investment
laws in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the issues discussed the
analysis will attempt to look at the state of investment
regulation during two time periods which tend to reflect
generational changes in attitudes towards investment, both
domestic and foreign. The first period, beginning early
sixties to mid-seventies, the early post independence
period; which was characterized by restrictive and
unattractive policies towards foreign investment .The second
period extends from the late seventies to present (or the
post debt crisis period) which marks the liberalization and
relaxation of a whole generation of investment laws and the
general regulatory environment.
The belief here is that future analyses of long term
investment opportunities in Africa must include a serious
recognition of attitude as a valid indicator of investment
prospects. In an attempt to understand the changes of
attitudes that underlie the generational shifts in
investment legislation, this paper addresses four important
issues, namely the (a) opportunities for admission or entry,
(b) the treatment of admitted investment, (c) the
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expropriation of foreign investment and, (d) the mechanisms
for settlement of disputes.' 6
i) Admission:
During the early post independence period, there were
two patterns to investment laws in Africa: (a) the
'comprehensive' laws which were in the form of an investment
code; and (b) the 'compound' laws usually less integrated
and where some component parts would be referred to in
another piece of legislation or in administrative practice,
for example company taxation or exchange control. One common
characteristic pervading all these was the fact that they
all alike in framework for attracting foreign capital but
doing so in multiple and divergent ways.
During this period the admission or entry provisions of
most investment laws usually consisted of enumerations and
declarations of categories of persons, businesses and
industries eligible for grant of special, favored, approved
or priority status. Most African countries determined these
categories in terms of their primary economic objectives.
They did this in a variety of ways. Most French-
speaking African had integrated investment codes which
provided in great detail categories and classifications of
This part of the analysis adopts the classification
used in the study of national investment codes by ANTONIO
R.PARRA Principles Governing Foreign Investment , as Reflected
in National Investment Codes 7(2)ICSID REVIEW 1992, PP. 428-
454
'This fact was deplored by the then Legal Advisor of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, for lack of
cooperative perspective and their tendency to outbid
competitors with better incentives; See, A.M. Akiwumi, A Plea
for the Harmonization of Africa Investment Laws, vol 19 JOURNAL
Of African Law 1975, p.134
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'approved' industries. For example, in Niger, preferential
treatment was given, among other things, enterprises
producing power, mining enterprises, enterprises engaged in
mechanical spinning, weaving, dyeing and knitting, the
manufacture of fertilizers and products necessary for
agriculture and fishing, including processing. ,c
Many English-speaking African countries, on the other
hand, did not have integrated investment codes. Some
investment laws did not enumerate a list of 'approved'
industries. In Kenya and Uganda, for instance, the Minister
of finance was vested with discretionary
powers to grant certificate of approval in respect of
foreign investment 'if he is of the opinion' that the
investment would further the economic development of the
country.' 1 Others did provided a list of 'approved'
industries but in a different government publication. In
Nigeria, a long list of 'pioneering' industries included
mining, smelting and refining, canned foodstuffs, rubber
soled shoes, tires, hotel keeping etc. But for registered
companies to obtain 'pioneer status', they had to procure a
finding from the Federal Executive Council that the industry
in question was not already being carried on in Nigeria, or
not on a scale suitable to the country's economic
requirements, or that it was expedient and in the public
^Niger Investment code, Law No. 68-24/PRN of July 31 st/
1968, art. 5.
73Kenya Foreign Investments Protection Act, 1964, (Cap
518) Laws of Kenya s.3(2)
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interest to encourage the development, or establishment, of
the industry in Nigeria. H0
It is important to recognize that virtually all African
investment were and are still closely linked to national
economic policies and are, therefore, complimentary to the
country's development plans. It is important to investors
looking for opportunities of entry into the host country's
economy to determine the objectives of the country's
development; so as to more precisely determine their role in
achieving those objectives. Some investment laws referred to
such development plans, others did not. The Ghana Capital
investments Decree" 1 and the Kenya Foreign Investments
Protection Act referred to national development plans.
Rwanda Law provides that, in considering applications by
enterprises wanting to enjoy favored status, the Ministerial
Commission handling such application shall base its
decision, first of all, on the " special effectiveness of
the enterprise within the framework of the Plan of Economic
and Social Development". 82
The second debt-crisis period saw a new generation of
investment laws which were more liberal and more easier to
foreign investors to work with. The new codes often set forth
simplified procedures for such matters as the approval of
foreign investments. In matters of restrictions to rights of
entry or admission of investments, these the sub-saharan
African codes can be classified into three groups. The First
-°Nigeria Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief)
Decree, 1971, No 22
81 1973, N.R.C.D. 141, ss. 7 and 25
b2Rwanda Investment Code, art. 10, Law No. 21/1987
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group contains no stated special restrictions on entry; the
second group contains restrictions but imposes almost no
limits on the discretion on the administering authority to
grant or deny permits; and the third group also contains
restrictions in form of requiring permits of entry but
imposes some limits on the discretion of administering
authority to grant or deny permits. 6.
The first group of codes of investment imposes very few
or no special restrictions on entry except for the
elementary requirements of public order. Typically, the code
would state that investments can be 'freely made' in the
country if not offensive to public health, morals,
environment etc... 84 For instance, the 1989 Investment Code
of Madagascar, which replaced the 1985 code, places very
minimal restrictions which are easily quantifiable .Under
this code, the general obligation imposed investors are
limited to the requirements that they comply with the laws
and regulations in force in the country. h "J
The second group of investment laws are the ones with
so called 'high discretion' provisions. Under these
provisions, the competent authority is given unlimited or
very few restrictions on discretion to grant or deny the
necessary permit applications."
See, Antonio R. Parra, supra note 7 6 at p. 4 30; The
classification used in this study makes sense in view of the
similarity of the many provisions of African investment laws.
85Loi No. 89-026 relative au Code des Investissements,
Official Journal, Jan 2, 1990, at p. 18
"''See ANTONIO PARRA supra note 76, at p. 4 30; This study
suggests that "high discretion" codes also tend to have a high
degree of bureaucratic involvement and a lot of restrictions
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TABLE 2: ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS
NO SPECIAL
RESTRICTIONS ON
ENTRY
SPECIAL PERMIT SPECIAL PERMIT
REQUIRED (NO LIMIT (LIMIT ON
ON DISCRETION) DISCRETION)
Benin
Burundi
Cameroon
Angola
Djibouti
Gabon
Central African Rep. Guinea-Bissau
Egypt
Ghana
Sudan
Zambia
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Cote D'lvoire
Guinea
Madagascar
Mauritania
Namibia
Niger
Rwanda
Senegal
Togo
Zaire
Mozambique
Somalia
Tanzania
Source: ICSID REVIEW Vol 7, 1992, Table 1, p. 432
As shown in table 2, about seven sub-saharan
countries involved in an ICSID study were identified as
falling in this group. The countries in this group reserve to
on foreign investment. They also make performance indices,
such as minimum local content, general requirements for the
admission of investments.
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the state, extensive legal control over the admission of
foreign investment.
The third group comprises of investment codes which
make special authorizations necessary but give the competent
authority clearly defined and limited discretion for denying
applications .Under these codes, authorizations will usually
only be refused for such cases as violation of local laws.
Codes in this group will specifically provide that a
decision to deny an application must be reasoned.' For
instance, under the Zambian Investment Act of 1986, 8I the
committee (which is the competent authority) , must approve
an application for investment license "if it finds that:-
(a) The application is in accordance with the
provisions of [the] act; or
(b) the activity planned to be undertaken by the
business enterprise is not unlawful or contrary to
the interests of Zambia." 89
Under the same act, the council , which is the final
decision making body in cases of denial by the committee, is
required to give reasons if it concurs with the committee."
In Sum, several positive features run through the
current generation of investment codes admission
requirements. First, most of them have a general bias in
81 Id at 431
No 5 of 1986; See also Thomas Allen Supra note 66 and
Mbao, The Investment act , 1986 of Zambia, 30 JOURNAL OF
African Law 197, (1986)
'"Id, Section 17(2); This section has been criticized for
being vague and blamed for the lack of enthusiasm by foreign
investors in Zambia- See Thomas Allen, supra note 76 at p. 52.
'"Id, Section 42(2). The Council, however, is the final
body of appeal
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favor of admission while at the same time reserving to the
state varying degrees of control of the process. Second,
there is a common desire to speed up and facilitate the
admission process. Third, the codes, even those containing
bureaucratic discretionary provisions, suggest that the
admission process is much more predictable, systematic and
is administered in accordance with law.
ii) Treatment:
This involves discussion of general standards of
treatment accorded to foreign investments, once they have
been admitted into the host country. This covers aspects
like non-discriminatory provisions in terms of incentives
and taxation and repatriation of profits.
In the early post independence period, many African
investment codes provided specific clauses putting all
investors foreign and domestic equal on footing. The codes
in Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville) , Rwanda, Chad and Dahomey
provided striking examples of this type of treatment.''
This meant that both private and foreign investment, if they
qualified, received equal treatment under the law and were
eligible for the same tax benefits and incentives except for
the repatriation of capital, profits and protection from
expropriation which were reserved for foreign investors
only.
On the other hand, some African countries had
designated their investment codes to apply only to foreign
investments. The early post-independence laws of Tanzania,
Kenya and Uganda had been clearly formulated to deal with
only foreign owned investments. For instance, the Tanzania
See United Nations, Supra note 64 pp. 6-9
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Foreign Investments Protection Act of 1963 was promulgated
as 'An act to give protection to certain approved foreign
investments and matters incidental thereto'. Similarly, the
Kenya and Uganda laws also provided that economic benefits
were to apply only to foreign assets invested or to be
invested by foreign nationals in those countries.'
Repatriation of capital and profits is usually an issue
that has mainly to do with foreign investments; since local
investments investors would not, in the normal course of
things, need to transfer profits out of the country.
However, in a free market environment and in situations of
scarce local resources, the regulatory control on
repatriation of profits has great effect on the interaction
between local and foreign capital.
In general, post-independence investment legislation
dealt with the issue of repatriation of profits in two ways.
One approach was to place no restrictions on remittances of
capital and profits in the hope that the foreign investments
would flow in and stay. For instance, Gabon placed on
remittances apart from the procedural requirements and the
availability of foreign exchange resources. ' The Chad
Investment Code also provided under article 3 that 'within
the framework of exchange regulations, the state guarantees
the right of transfer of capital; especially in case of: (1)
duly audited profits; (2) funds derived from transfer or
cessation of business."1
9
~See, Kenya Investments Protection Act (1963) and Uganda
Foreign Investments (Protection) Act (1964)
.
'"See, Gabon Investment Law, ordinance No. 16/67, art.
3
"See, Chad Investment Code, Ordinance No.025/PR/87
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The other approach was to place restrictions and
various conditions on the transfer of funds out of the host
country. Countries such as Algeria, Kenya, Somalia and
Uganda placed restrictions on the amount of capital and
profits out of the host countries. For instance, under the
Kenya Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1964 an approved
enterprise was entitled to repatriate, in the approved
foreign currency, profits after payment of taxes on its
investment capital, an approved proportion of the net
proceeds, principal and interest on loans and any
compensation paid upon nationalization. 9 '
Fair and equitable or better yet, special and
preferential treatment under the host country's tax system
is a major determining factor for potential foreign
investors considering opportunities in the African
countries. The general purpose of tax incentives and other
fiscal inducements is to help out new industries overcome
initial hardships of establishment and also help steer
investment flow into selected and predetermined geographical
and economic areas. 56
A whole range of tax inducements were available to
foreign investors under post-independence investment laws.
These included corporate tax holidays, capital allowances,
such as investment allowance, initial allowance, annual
allowance, all resulting in accelerated depreciation, carry
forward of losses, tax free dividends to shareholders,
-Article 7(a), (b) and (c) . See also The Exchange Control
Act Cap 113, Laws of Kenya.
"T.M. Ocran, The Legal Framework of Foreign Investment
in Africa 12 ZAMBIA L.J. 1,4-5(1980)
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exemptions from taxes on property, income and profits and so
on. .
The new generation of investment codes after the debt
crisis have somewhat changed in terms of treatment accorded
to foreign investors . The majority of current sub-saharan
investment codes do contain provisions to the effect that
foreign investors shall enjoy the same treatment accorded to
nationals" For instance, under the Namibian Investment Code
of 1990, all foreign investments in Namibia not classified
as status investments shall be entitled to treatment
equivalent to that of enjoyed by Namibian investors." There
is no standard definition for the term 'national treatment 1
and therefore this may have different meanings in different
countries. Some codes extend fiscal and other privileges to
foreigners that may not be available to nationals. So many
African countries have concluded treaties requiring them to
extend standards of treatment to aliens that may differ from
the national treatment. Some countries have no provision
stating what kind of treatment available for foreign
investors
.
On transfer of capital and profits, no African country
has provision for unconditional repatriation of capital and
""In bilateral treaty practice, the national treatment
standard is frequently combined with a most favored-nation
clause, so that as regards particular issues, investors of
each contracting party are assured of the most favorable
conditions available in the other state.
"Section 3(2) (Act 27 of 1990)
,
published in the
Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia, no. 129, Dec
28,1990. This is also supplemented by section 3(1) which
specifies that in foreign nationals " may invest and engage in
any business activity in Namibia which any Namibian may
undertake". For a general of the Namibian Investment Code see,
Stephen C. Vasciannie, supra note 6.
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profits. The majority of them do guarantee the repatriation
of capital and profits, but make this guarantee subject to
foreign exchange, tax and other relevant regulations. For
instance, Under the new Tanzanian National Investment
(Promotion and Protection) Act of 1990, a foreign investor
can, with the permission of the Bank Of Tanzania, retain in
an external account a portion of his foreign exchange
earnings for the purposes, among other things, debt
servicing, profit and dividend payment obligations."-
Again the new Cameroon Investment Code of 1990, 10 °
guarantees the transfer for foreign investors of dividends,
royalties, debt service but transfers outside the franc zone
and those exceeding 500,000 CFAF must be declared and
authorized by the Ministry of Finance. 101 Some African codes
of investment add further restrictions, such as that capital
may be repatriated only after a specified period has elapsed
or in installments. Under the 1989 Investment Code of
Madagascar, for example, the right of free transfer is
limited by several restrictions, including, a stipulation
that funds received from the sale of an [enterprise] may
only be remitted in three yearly installments. 102
In general terms, the current investment codes in Sub-
saharan Africa are more fair and equitable in terms of
treatment of both foreign and local investors. 10 ' In some
-See, Section 25 of Act No. 10 of 1990
1005ee, Ordinance Law No. 90/001 of Jan. 1990
101 Id, art. 4(2) and art. 8(1-2)
l02 Supra note 69, Art. 11 and 13
"See, the new 1990 Uganda Investment Code which declares
itself in it's preamble as 1 code to make provision in the
law to local and foreign investments in Uganda by providing
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cases the laws have been more tilted in favor of benefitting
foreign investors over local investors,
iii) Protection:
Historically, protection of foreign investment has
always been and still remains an issue of major importance
to foreign investors. 104 This factor together with the rate
of return and ability to remit capital and profits forms a
major component part of what is usually described as the
investment climate in the host country. The other component
factor are the fears of domination and exploitation on the
part of the host countries . 10b
Investment climate considerations will generally focus
on the broad business and socio-political factors that are
conducive to the activity which potential foreign investors
want to engage in. As part of the assessment, prospective
investors will need to know the state of host country's
infrastructure, political and social stability, the quality
of its labor force and its financial institutions, and the
effectiveness of its bureaucracy among other things.
Immediately after independence, most African countries
indicated in their policy declarations and constitutional
documents their reluctance to embark on policies of
nationalization and the acceptance of the principle of
compensation if nationalization became inevitable. Some
Investment codes contained clauses allowing nationalization
more favorable conditions for investment, . . .
'
104 5ee, e.g. GROSSE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODES AND THE
Location of Direct Investment (1980)
D5For a historical treatment of the subject, see,
Fouilloux, La Nationalization et la Droit International Public,
Librarie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris 1962
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only on stated grounds - e.g public interest, public
benefit. Others stipulated no such grounds but allowed for
nationalization if it was done in accordance with the
national laws and was accompanied by appropriate
compensation.
During the period from 1960 's to early 1970' s, some
African countries engaged in a rash of terminations and
repudiations of contracts with foreign investors and
nationalized their assets. While many of them promised
'prompt, adequate and effective' compensation, many states
paid partial or no compensation and others paid inadequate
lump sum compensation. 106
For example the Kenya Foreign Investments Protection
Act provided that no property or interest therein protected
by the act shall be compulsorily acquired except in the
public interest, and if so acquired, prompt and full
compensation will be paid. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda had
constitutional provisions for the protection of private
property and payment of just compensation in cases
nationalization.
Such provisions on the law books, in the light of the
nationalizations and appropriations that took place in
several African states, did not help promote sense of
confidence and security among foreign investors. While many
capital exporting countries did not question the right of
''"For exploration of topic of nationalization of foreign
investments in Africa generally, see, ADEOYE AKINSANYA, The
Expropriation of Multinational Property in the Third World
(1980); "Indigenisation or Nationalization of Private Foreign
Investments" , in Ubogu et al . (Eds), Development Planning in
ECOWAS (1983)
,pp. 365-409; International Protection of Direct
Foreign Investments in the Third World (1987) INTERNATIONAL
and Comparative Law Quarterly p. 58
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sovereign states to expropriate alien assets, they were
opposed to nationalizations which were not accompanied by "
prompt, adequate and effective compensation" 1 ' which, they
believed, were inimical to a good investment climate. l!
The current generation of African investment codes
after the debt crisis have made some changes in an effort to
improve the investment climate. A few countries have gone to
the extremes of enacting absolute guarantees against
expropriation in a desire to reverse previous perceptions of
country's hostility towards foreign investment and business
101 The rule that prompt, adequate and effective
compensation has to be paid for expropriation to be lawful
appears in a large number of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) and is supported by many western jurists as
reflecting customary international law ( see, e.g., Domke, 55
AM. J. INT' L L. 603 (1961) ; see also the overview in WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1085 (1963-); and 2 RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 712c (1987) .
The formula was coined by U.S Secretary of State Cordell Hull
in a letter to the Mexican government dated July 21, 1938. It
was disputed however by the Mexican government at that time
(Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs to Secretary of State of
the U.S., August 3, 1938, 3 HACKWORTH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 657 (1942) and has also been disputed by many other
writers since then. These writers have maintained that the
Hull formula was never a rule of traditional international
customary law and cannot, in any case, be considered as
existing international applicable to all cases of
expropriation of alien property (see e. g. ,Schachter,
Compensation for Expropriation, 7 8 AM. J. INT ' L L. 121-30
(1984) ;Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of
Alien Property, 75 AM.J.INT'L L. 561 (1981).
10a 5ee, A. Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct
Foreign Investment in the Third World (1987) 36 I.C.L.Q
58, p. 60. The United States, for example, responded to
unilateral acts of nationalizations by adopting the
Hickenlopper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Acts 1962,
1963 and 1964, which suspended bilateral aid programs and also
withdrew trade preferential treatment privileges under the
United States Trade Act of 1974 from countries expropriating
assets of U.S citizens.
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in general. 1 However, the majority of African codes do
still provide for expropriation but only in public interest
and on payment of compensation. 11C Some codes do not contain
provisions for expropriation but the same provisions may be
found set forth in their constitutional documents.
The provisions for compensation set forth different
measures and modalities of payment. Some codes provide that
foreign investor will receive compensation equal to the
"actual value" of the investment; while others refer to
"market value" or " fair and equitable" compensation. 111 In
general, these investment protection provisions remain too
ambiguous and indefinite for the comfort of potential
investors. In fact, many capital generating states believe
that damage to the investment climate arises as soon as
expropriation occurs.
Some investor countries have concluded bilateral
agreements with African countries for the reciprocal
promotion, encouragement and protection of direct
investments. For example, the United States has concluded
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with several African
states for the promotion and protection of United States
direct investment in those countries . Such treaties will
0:45ee, The Egyptian Investment Law No. 230/89 and Ghanian
code Supra.
l0See, section 11(1) of 1990 Namibian Foreign Investments
Act and article 4 of 1990 Cameroon Investment Code.
lu 5ee, Uganda Investment Code vol.1 Laws of Uganda (1990)
s.29(2) states that "Where.. a business enterprise, of an
investor ... is compulsorily. . acquired, compensation in respect
of the fair market value of the enterprise .. .within a period
not exceeding twelve months from the date of., acquisition";
See also under the Zambian Constitution, art. 18(1) guarantees
"payment of compensation" but does not add any other
qualifiers
.
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usually contain references to expropriation, compensation,
"most favored nation" treatment and settlement of disputes.
These treaties are drafted by the investor countries and
they attempt to give investment protection beyond that
provided under customary international law and the host
country's domestic law.
A typical United States investments promotion and
protection treaty will appear as follows:
Property of nationals and companies of either
party shall not be taken within the territories of
the other party except for a public purpose nor
shall it be taken without the prompt payment of
just compensation. Such compensation shall be in
an effectively realizable form and shall represent
the full equivalent of the property taken; and
adequate provisions shall have been made at or
prior to the time of taking for the determination
and payment thereof. 112
A BIT concluded between The Federal Republic of Germany
and Zambia in december 1966, ni and which came into force on
august 25, 1972, required each state to treat investors from
the other state, fairly and equitably and no less favorably
than nationals of the host state or other states. 114 The
treaty also stated that a protected investment may not be
112 5ee, (1963) 2 I.L.M. 1099
13Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Republic of Zambia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, reprinted in the International
Center for the Settlement Of Investment Disputes, Investment
Laws of the World (looseleaf)
114 Id, Art.l (fair and equitable treatment) and Art. 2 (
national treatment and most favored nation
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expropriated, " except for the public benefit and against
compensation". 11 '" According to the treaty, compensation was
to "represent the equivalent of the investment expropriated"
and " shall be actually realizable, freely transferable, and
shall be made without delay". llb
In addition to negotiating BITs, many investor
countries created official state or quasi-state organs to
provide their investors with insurance from losses in
foreign countries caused by political risks. 117 These
institutions provide coverage for their nationals abroad
against war, civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection
or similar disturbance in the host state, inconvertibility,
expropriation, confiscation or requisition by the host
government. The insuring country usually seeks to conclude
an investment guarantee agreement with the host country
which provides that the insuring agency may obtain
subrogation. These agreements are almost identical and deal
with only subrogation and dispute settlement. 118
115 Id, art. 3(2)
116 Id, art. 3(2)
117 There are also private insurance arrangements, not
discussed here.
UoThere is little evidence that either BITs or investment
insurance actually does encourage foreign investment although
that is the general belief. It is, however, likely that absence
of these benefits will tend to discourage investment
.
See,
Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries, (1990) 24 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 655, p. 674; Also
see, Cable and Persaud, New Trends and Policy Problems in
Foreign Investment : The Experience of Commonwealth Developing
Countries, Cable and Persaud, eds... Developing with Foreign
Investment, p. 16 (1987).
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Dispute settlement is another issue of investment
protection that is of major concern to investors. In
general, unless parties stipulate otherwise, settlement of
investment disputes falls under the jurisdiction of local
courts. 11 '. This legal position, while not disputed, is
generally unsatisfactory to many western writers and
investor countries when it comes to investment in developing
countries. That is why many investor countries prefer the
availability of international arbitration as an alternative
recourse to local courts. Of course, international
arbitration is a voluntary mechanism which is available if
both parties consent and mutually submit to it. However,
once they submit, they have to honor that undertaking and
cannot unilaterally withdraw. 120
Many African codes provide for different types of
arbitration both local and international. A majority of
African Countries are members of the Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ( "ICSID"
)
lkl and
lVjSee eg. , REDFERN AND HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
International Commercial Arbitration 19 (1986) .
120 For a detailed discussion on the principles of
international arbitration see, SIMPSON AND FOX INTERNATIONAL
Arbitration 1 (1959) ;Redfern and Hunter, supra; institute of
International Law, Resolution on Arbitration Between States,
State Enterprises or State Entities and Foreign Enterprises
(63/11 ANNUAIRE DE L'lNSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 215 (1990)
Santiago de Compostela, 1989); SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL
Arbitration: Three Salient Problems 14 (1987) .
lza ICSID was established by the Convention on the
Settlement Investment Disputes, 575 UNTS 159. Since many
African Countries have given the convention municipal effect
by enacting it as part of domestic law.
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Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA") . x " ICSID
provides investors and states with facilities for the
arbitration and conciliation of investment disputes. MIGA's
primary activity is the issuance of investment guarantees
where they are not available under a national programme.lt
may also engage in research and, if requested by a member,
provide it with technical advice and assistance to improve
its investment conditions. 123 Whereas it is not clear that by
joining these institutions African countries increase their
chances of attracting new investments, it is likely that
refusal to join will tend to discourage investment.
Despite their reference to international arbitration,
the majority of African codes emphasize that local courts
have original jurisdiction in disputes between the investor
and the host government. The 1990 Cameroon Investment Code 1 ' 4
provides a typical example of provisions found in many other
African codes. Articles 44 and 45 provide for mechanisms of
dispute settlement under the code. Under article 44 the
parties may choose to settle disputes in the courts of
Cameroon. But under article 45, a foreign investor reserves
the right to have any dispute pertaining to the validity and
interpretation of the investment agreement arbitrated or
conciliated under the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) or the ICSID. Alternatively, the parties may
:z
'MIGA was established by the Convention Establishing the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and came into force
on April 12, 1988, See (1986) 1 ICSID REVIEW 147.
'Id, Art. 23(a) and (c) and also see, Shihata, Towards
a Greater Depoliticisation of Investment Disputes : The Roles
of ICSID and MIGA, (1986) 1 ICSID REVIEW 1.
124 Supra note 100
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resort to the procedures specified under the BIT between
Cameroon and investors home state.
In sum, looking at all the measures taken by the
African countries and on the international scale for the
promotion and protection of direct investment, it is clear
that today, s foreign investors in Africa enjoy much better
protection than their predecessors in the early post
independence period. This trend is further evidence that
African attitudes towards foreign investment and business is
increasingly changing for the better.
CHAPTER IV
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
Aside from the debt crisis and political and legal
reform, there are world events, some not directly connected
with Sub-Saharan Africa, which are forcing changes in the
way Africans have historically related to outsiders .These
events include the integration of Europe into a Single
European Market (SEM) , the end of the cold war and the end
of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. The next
discussion is going to focus on the impact these
developments will have in the way Sub-Saharan African
countries do business within the sub-continent and with
other countries.
A) SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON
AFRICA:
In 1985 the European Economic Community (EEC) passed
the Single European Act (SEA) which was to initiate a number
of actions leading to a full integration of the European
market into a single market by the year 1992. An integrated
Single European Market (SEM) translates into an internal
market of 300 million people, with free movement of people,
goods, services and capital within the member states. It is
also supposed to bring tremendous business opportunities for
the rest of the world through the removal of internal
barriers and higher economic growth. On the other hand, this
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may lead to substantial trade losses for some extra-
community producers as the competitiveness of the European
Community (EC) firms is enhanced and possibly, protectionist
barriers raised to facilitate the burden of adjustment of
internal producers.
The Sub-saharan countries have binding relations with
the European Community through their membership of the EEC-
ACP group. 1 '" Their links were further strengthened by the
adoption of the latest Lome IV convention in 1989, which
like all previous conventions, deals with mainly trade
concessions, financial and technical aid to the Sub-Saharan
countries. Running through are three distinctive features
covering aid, stabex and trade. 126
Under the conventions, the community is obliged to give
a certain negotiated amount of aid to ACP countries through
the European Development Fund (EDF) . This amounted to 8.5
billion ECU under Lome III, 127 and 12 billion ECU under Lome
IV. 128 The community also subsidizes short falls in export
earnings of selected commodities from the ACP countries
under its stabex regulations. An ACP country qualifies for
stabex assistance if its export earnings from a listed
"The original EEC-ACP Lome convention was signed at
Lome, the capital of Togo in 1975, by Heads of states of the
EEC and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.
"For detailed discussion of the conventions, see, C.
Stevens "EEC and Africa', AFRICAN CONTEMPORARY RECORD,
1983/84, pp.A203-205: s The EEC's Year in Africa', A.C.R.,
1985/86, pp.A208-215, and Tony Hill, Whither Lome? A Review of
the Lome III negotiations, THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, (3) July
1985, pp. 661-681.
127
see, WEST AFRICA, 25 February, 1985, p. 362
128 see, The Courier, No. 119,1990, p.l.
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commodity falls by 7.5% below the average price in the
community market over the previous four years. Many Sub-
Saharan countries have benefited from stabex transfers.
Again the conventions grant Sub-Saharan countries trade
concessions for their exports to community member states.
Over 99% of Sub-Saharan exports enter the community market
duty free. Although it is unlikely that the EC will
completely abrogate this relationship, it has failed to
guarantee its continuation after the expiry of Lome IV.
i) Effect on Trade:
The Sub-Saharan African countries are particularly
concerned about the possibility that the currently most
restrictive national trade barriers would be extended on a
community wide basis and 'reciprocity principle' would be
used by the EC as a bargaining chip to allow access to the
EC market. Whereas other developing countries could gain
access to a "Fortress Europe" through direct investment,
most African countries do not possess the financial and
technical capacity to do so.
In the period 1975-1990, the EC made up between 40-60
per cent of Sub-Saharan Africa's import-export markets.
However, since the first half of the 1980s, the EC market
share of Africa exports have been shrinking steadily, partly
because of the appreciation European Currencies against the
US dollar; and partly due to the low competitiveness and
supplyside bottlenecks. 123 This is so, despite preferences
Africans still enjoy under the Lome convention.
The essence of the SEM is to reduce production costs
for EC producers through scale effects and to eliminate
l
^'See, IMF YEARBOOK 1989 and 1985.
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inefficiencies in the current imperfect customs union.
According to the study on the benefits of the Single
Market, 1 - EC productivity and competitiveness will increase
and this will be reflected in the downward pressure on EC
consumer prices. The price effect will translate into "trade
diversions" 1 " 1 as EC producers become more competitive and
intra-EC trade increases to the detriment of extra-EC trade.
At the same time, price declines and accelerating economic
activity will raise real incomes which will lead to "trade
Creation" and this will benefit African exporters.
For African countries, Trade diversion (the redirection
of trade away from traditional suppliers and towards EC
partners of EC members) , mainly affects the manufacturing
sector. It is not likely to impact any primary products
exported by African countries, since the EC does itself
produce these products. 132
In terms of imports from Europe, to the extent that SEM
leads to restructuring, it may lead to increased
concentration of EC industries and thus, oligopolistic
power. This, therefore, may not offer the cheapest source of
imports for African countries,
ii) Effect on Investment Flows:
130 5ee, CECHINI PAOLO, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE
BENEFIT OF A SINGLE MARKET (Aldershot : Wildwood Press, 1988).
slAccording to the classical theory of economic
integration, trade diversion occurs when a common external
tariff replaces national tariffs of countries participating in
the customs union.
liz See, Michael Davenport and C. Stevens, The Outlook for
Tropical Products, in C. STEVENS AND D. FABER (eds), THE URUGUAY
Round and Europe 1992 : Implications for future ACP/EC
Cooperation, Europe Center for Development Policy Management,
Maastricht, pp.5180.
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A Single European Market is likely to direct investment
capital towards financial speculation and more "lucrative"
endeavors, to the detriment of useful investments in the
developing countries. Sub-Saharan African countries have
experienced a steady decline of direct foreign investment
inflows during the last decade.
Table 3: InFlows Of Foreign Direct Investment
(millions of US Dollars)
1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
World 52212.2 44236.7 50658.9 48959.9 77459.9 118059.7 143869.9
Developing
Countries
10887.0 14253.3 12046.5 13291.9 13875.0 23550.9 25096.5
Developing
Africa 311.9 1410.8 1378.9 2570.6 1751.3 2227.2 2853.4
Africa's Share
in World (%) 0.6 3.2 2.7 5.3 2.3 1.9 2.0
Africa's Share in Developing
Countries(%) 2.9 9.9 11.4 19.3 12.6 9.5 11.4
Source: United Nations, Center on Transnational Corporations
Based on International Monetary Fund, Balance of payments Tape,
Nov. 1989 and information from OECD, Development
Corporation (Par is, OECD, 1991)
Table 3 shows that direct investment inflows towards
Africa have been declining consistently over the second half
of the 1980s. Whereas, the figures on direct investment in
Africa tend to fluctuate from year to year, there is a clear
trend of diversion of investment from Africa to the EC. The
fluctuation is partly due to changes in the political and
economic environment and to the variability of profits and
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retained earnings valuation effects of the exchange rates
changes. 1 " SEM will also result in increased
competition between firms attempting to sell their products
to Europe so that investments, both outside and inside the
EEC will be carefully selected. Africa stands little chance
of attracting European industrial capital because of its low
comparative advantages in relation to other regions.
Some Sub-Saharan African are also concerned about their
monetary relations with the European Countries. At their
independence, almost all former french African colonies
joined the Union Monitaire Oust ' Africaine, also known as the
Franc zone; which shared a single central bank and a single
currency known as the CFA franc. With membership to the
franc zone, these countries were guaranteed a fixed parity
of one French (FCFA) franc to 50 African (CFA) francs, paid
all their foreign exchange earnings into the account in
Paris and had unlimited convertibilty into foreign
currencies. 134 The Africans were afraid that the new European
Monetary union is not going to tolerate any special
relationship between the French franc and the CFA franc.
In mid-January of 1994, the fears of Franc zone African
countries were realized. To the Shock of the CFA countries
and without any consultation, or warning, France devalued
133 See, Thisen Jean K, The European Single Market in 1992
and its Possible Effects on African Economies Vol.18 (1) AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT pp. 5-25, (1993)
i4 see r Kenneth B. Noble, French Devaluation of African
Currency Brings Wide Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, February 23, 1994 at
Al,A6. According to the author, this special "cozy 1 and
sometimes * contradictory' post-colonial economic relationship
is subsidized by the French Treasury to the tune of $ 2-3
billion a year. This caused substantial unhappiness among
international financial institutions and other western
countries, who argued France to stop the subsidies.
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CFA franc to 100 to 1, half its previous value. 1 The
immediate effects were predictable; price increases, price
controls, wage freezes; all of which resulted in labor
disputes, wild cat strikes and widespread civil unrest
throughout French speaking West Africa. 136 Whereas no one
knows the longterm effects of the devaluation, the World
Bank believes that this will ultimately encourage new
investments in raw materials and discourage misuse of
valuable hard currency to buy products these countries can
easily produce on their own. 131
B) THE END OF THE COLD WAR:
The great events of Eastern Europe of the period 1989-
1990 marked the end of the Soviet Communist empire and the
end of the cold war. The changes that took place in that
period were widely interpreted in the west as proof of the
supremacy of capitalism over socialism. The main feature of
the cold war, was the ideological conflict between the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. For the west, the conflict was portrayed as a
struggle between democracy and communism. 138
Thus in their effort to obtain allies in the third
world in general, and Africa, in particular, the two sides
gave support to opposing sides in regional conflicts; and
instead of attempting to resolve them, they simply escalated
135 Id; The countries affected were Senegal, The comoros,
Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Chad, Benin, the Central African
Republic, Congo, Gabon, Niger, Togo, Cameroon, Mali and
Equatorial Guinea
136 Id.
^ 7 Id.
13o 5ee, Harris cheryl L, The Impact of the End of the Cold
War on Africa GUILD PRACTITIONER, 48 (4 ) , p. 101, (1991)
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The end of the cold war has generated tremendous spur
to African political and economic development. An increasing
number of African countries have followed Eastern Europe in
instituting democratic reforms. The trend towards democratic
reform cannot be over-emphasized or exaggerated; but it
certainly represents the most important political shift the
continent has experienced since independence. 141 It is also
clear that the democracy movement has far deeper roots than
many observers had imagined. At every level of government,
indigenous institutions are evolving as a response to
popular demands. It is still difficult to determine the
future direction of these changes, but many African
governments have come to realize that democratic
institutions are essential to "sustainable and equitable
development". 142 They also understand that democracy brings
predictability, accountability, and the rule of law, all of
which are indispensable in building domestic and foreign
business confidence,
ii) Economic effects:
The end of the cold war has led to opening up of new
markets in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This
has sharpened competition with Sub-Saharan Africa's efforts
to attract new foreign business. Eastern Europe is in a far
better position to attract new industrial capital for
several reasons. First, the basic infrastructure (roads,
railways, channels, electricity, telecommunications, etc)
"See Aronson David, Why Africa Stays Poor: and Why It
doesn't Have To. Vol.53 HUMANIST p9(6) March-april, 1993.
'"Feldman, Gerald M, Sub-Saharan Africa is poised for
renewed private sector growth: Commitment to free enterprise
was reaffirmed in 1992. (1993 World Trade Outlook) ,114 BUSINESS
AMERICA p. 33 (2) , April 19, 1993.
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already exist. Second, all Eastern European countries have
experienced a high level of industrialization which Africa
still lacks.
Another post-cold war effect has been that Africa has
been sliding down the ladder of the Western countries'
foreign policy agenda. There has been a significant decline
or stagnation in western aid to Africa and a concurrent
diversion of aid towards Eastern Europe. As for economic
assistance from Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, that ended
with the disintegration of the Soviet Empire. 1 "' Economic aid
from Arab oil producers has also dropped significantly and
in some cases completely disappeared. In short, there is no
real hope that concessional assistance will be increased or
even maintained at current levels; in fact all signs are
that it will continue to decline.
C) THE END OF APARTHEID IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:
In may, 1994 the Republic of South Africa installed its
first democratically elected majority government. This ended
46 years of the white minority rule and the system of
separate development or apartheid which was introduced by
the Nationalist party in 1948.
A politically stable and economically prosperous post-
apartheid will be an economic powerhouse for most of Sub-
Saharan Africa. South Africa produces 80 percent of Southern
Africa's regional exports and absorbs almost half of its
imports. With its much more strong economy, excellent
communication infrastructure, highly skilled and technical
labor force and talented management and abundance of natural
4
'U.S. bilateral economic assistance to Africa, after
declining for several years, rose in 1991 as Congress
appropriated more than the administration requested. See,
Lancaster C. (1991), Supra note 139.
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resources, the Republic stands in a good position as a
future economic engine and a hub for investment for the rest
of Africa. 14 '1 Currently, South Africa trades with most of the
African countries although this amounts to only seven
percent of its total trade. 14 "
With the abolishment of apartheid, came the end of
international sanctions against South Africa. This makes
South Africa's economy much more attractive for foreign
investment, not just for that country but for many of its
neighboring countries. Many observers expect future South
Africa to be the gateway to the burgeoning larger market in
Sub-Saharan Africa. This regional market of 230 million
potential consumers, they say, is developing as the ' fourth
economic bloc 1 outside North America, Europe, and the
Pacific Rim. 146
144 5ee, Miller, W., South Africa (after apartheid) 240
INDUSTRIAL WEEK Nov. 4, 1991 at p. 50. Also see, Eaton Leslie,
Investors Who Discovered Africa, THE N.Y. TIMES April 3, at
F4
. According to this recent report, Sub-Saharan Africa has
become " a hot new target for international investors" who
have raised over $ 350 million for this purpose. This is
largely due to the peaceful and orderly change of power that
took place in South Africa in May 1994. Now many investors are
adopting a more hopeful and optimistic view about the longterm
investment prospects in other parts of Africa.
14
^5ee, Michaels, Marguerite, Retreat From Africa. (U.S.-
Africa relations) (America and the world 1992/93) 72 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS p. 93 (16), winter, 1993 145
146Miller W.H., Supra note 144.
CONCLUSION
The major question dealt with in this paper has been;
what single most positive impact have the great world events
like the debt crisis, the end of the cold war and the
formation of the Single European Market had on Sub-Saharan
African development? It is submitted that the answer lies in
the way these and other events have shaped a new attitude
and outlook of Africans towards the role of foreign and
domestic investment and business in national development.
This willingness to change attitudes, has been symbolized by
many African government's attempts at implementing genuine
democratic political reforms, undertaking of major economic
reforms aimed at liberalizing in favor of free markets and
economic legislation aimed at attracting new capital
investment to and promote free market activity on the
subcontinent.
At independence, many African nationalist governments
were suspicious and openly hostile to foreign investment and
business in general. They were mainly pre-occupied with
issues of economic control and political independence from
foreign domination. There was less concern for promotion and
protection of both foreign and domestic private enterprise.
The debt crisis underscored the need for change in political
ideology and economic policies. Although many changes have
been impressed on the African governments from outside, the
degree of success has depended and will continue to depend
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much on the enthusiasm with which those changes are embraced
and implemented. A recent world bank study of African
economies found that those countries that carried out the
IMF/World Bank sponsored tough austerity economic reforms
under Structural Adjustment improved their economic growth
in their per capita income. The reluctant reformers and the
renegades, on the other hand, either stagnated or continued
to deteriorate. 147
This study also reveals a new important factor in
African thinking. An increasing number of African leaders
have come to one important realization; that salvation from
Africa, s enormous socio-economic problems will come from
within and not from without the continent. This realization
is forcing governments to re-assess their customary views
about the role of foreign aid in economic development . The
old African traditional values of self-reliance are slowly
finding their way into modern political thought. 146 There is
now emerging a movement to discourage over-emphasis on
foreign assistance as the main tool for development.
Finally, one more sign of change in attitudes in part
caused by events beyond Africa's control is the rate of
increasing regional trade and cooperation. African
governments now realize the need to pool their political and
economic resources to foster intra and inter-regional
cooperation, trade and investment. Larger markets and
14 see, World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results
and The Road Ahead (1994)
UoPresident Museveni of Uganda was recently quoted saying
that " We have to go back to the year 1500, where we left off
building an economy integrated in itself, able to produce its
own food, its own tools, its own weapons." See, Christopher
Hitchens, African Gothic VANITY FAIR, 92 at p. 112, Nov, 1994
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greater commerce among African states will afford
populations greater prosperity and promote internal and
interstate peace. The influence of foreign investors will
also favor larger markets against competition for western
investment from Eastern Europe, India, the Far East and
elsewhere. 149
Currently, there are five economic customs unions or
"common markets" in Africa. Economic Community of Western
African States (ECOWAS) , headquartered in Nigeria, comprises
of 17 Western equatorial nations including Cote D'lvoire,
Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. The Central African Customs and
Economic Union (UDEAC) , headquartered in Central African
Republic, and comprises of central equatorial nations
including Cameroon, Congo and Gabon. The South African
Customs Union (SACU) is headquartered in Pretoria, South
Africa and comprises of four nations situated along the Cape
of Good Hope: Bostwana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa.
The Preferential Trade Area of East and Southern Africa
(PTA) is headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia and comprises of 16
nations in East and southern Africa. South African
Development Coordination Committee, (SADCC) is headquartered
in Gaborone, Botswana and comprises of nine countries in
Southwest Africa. The last three trading blocks have
overlapping memberships; and there is a likelihood in future
of a move to get them consolidated.
i9See, Mazrui Ali A., The Bondage of Boundaries (Africa)
328 ECONOMIST p.F28(3), Sept 11, 1993. Dr Mazrui states in
this article boundaries that divide nations in Africa will be
altered in the coming generations, as the continent seeks to
reassert itself in the post-colonial period. There is likely
to be more regional integration and ethnic self-determination
as part of this process.
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Regional integration in Africa offers foreign investors
and business opportunity to operate across national
borders, with little regard to customs and tariffs, to take
advantage of a larger consumer or manufacturing base than is
available in just one country, and also to spread potential
political risk.
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